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1 Introduction  
Oil and gas from deepwater fields is becoming an increasingly important 
to supply the world’s energy need. Offshore has provided nearly 70% of 
the major oil and gas discoveries worldwide in the last decade and 
Deepwater oil and gas discoveries have averaged 5.5 billion bbl. of oil 
equivalent/year over the last 5 years with an average discovery size of 
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150 million bbl vs. 25 million bbl for onshore.1 With more activities in 
less favorable deepwater areas, offshore oil and gas exploitation and 
exploration have also been a main source of marine oil pollution. The 
risk of offshore oil production causing oil spills is becoming increasingly 
high which has been demonstrated by the latest incidents incurred 
.According to the Maritime Accident Casebook, there have been, not 
counting Deepwater Horizon, 44 notable blowout events world-wide 
since 1955. 2The mean interval between the blowouts was about 15 
months.3  
The recent catastrophic oil pollution arising from the explosion of the 
Deepwater Horizon oilwell in the Gulf of Mexico on 20 April 2010, and  
a series of oil spills that began on June 4, 2011 at Bohai Bay of China 
have received high publicity . 
The Purposes of this thesis   
The series of oil spills at Bohai Bay of China 2011 has revealed the 
weakness of China’s legal framework on the oil spill arising from 
offshore installment .Though by 2013 September China has surpassed 
United State to become largest oil importer and China's offshore 
petroleum industry has been developed rapidly during last decade, there 
are still many gaps in legislations on offshore oil spill . China’s legal 
                                                          
1
 .Rafael Sandrea , Deepwater crude oil output: How large will the uptick be? Available at 
http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-108/issue-41/exploration-development/deepwater-crude-oil-output-
how-large.html 
2
 See Delving Into Deepwater—Before The Blow-Out, MARITIME ACCIDENT CASEBOOK (July 9, 2013), 
http://maritimeaccident.org/2010/07/delving-into-deepwater-before-the-blow-out   
3
 Ibid 
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framework is not well prepared for large oil spill incident such as Bohai 
Bay spill 2011 . The need to examine the current legal framework 
regulating oil spill from offshore installment has become an urgent 
problem for China. The Bohai Oil Spill accident has provided a classical 
case study for improving marine environmental prevention mechanism 
and building a comprehensive liability and compensation regime.  
 
This thesis is inspired by the legal problems represents in the recent 
devastating incidents .The scope of this thesis however, is confined to oil  
pollution arising from the offshore oil exploration and exploitation 
activities Oil spills have occurred virtually everywhere around the globe, 
and they pose challenges to the environmental, administrative, 
regulatory, maritime, and tort laws of legal systems.4 In this thesis, I 
choose to narrow down the focus to only one of those challenges 
presented: Liability regime on oil pollution arising from the offshore 
facilities. Specific questions such as whether the current legal framework 
on international level for liability concerning offshore oil pollution is 
robust and comprehensive enough and whether the compensation 
provided by the existing liability regime is adequate and efficient to 
                                                          
4
 Vernon Valentine Palmer ,The Great Spill in the Gulf … and a Sea of Pure Economic Loss: Reflections on the 
Boundaries of Civil Liability, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 105 (2011) 
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cover the damages rising from such incidents are being seriously are 
going to be examined. 
Understanding the current legal framework concerning the oil spill 
arising from offshore installments on international level is a necessary 
step to evaluate the problems, which provide the basis to examine the  
domestic law . Also, analyzing how liability for damages is regulated and 
whether adequate compensation has been achieved under different 
jurisdictions is equally important .By comparison, it is easy to exam the 
weakness in the current liability regime of China. By drawing the 
strengths of other regimes, more robust and efficient liability regime can 
be achieved in China . 
The plan of this thesis is as follows: 
1 )To provide a brief analysis on existing international conventions 
regulating oil spill arising from offshore facilities with particular 
emphasis on the part concerning liability and compensation for oil 
pollution . 
2) To analyze how the liability and compensation mechanisms work in 
three given jurisdictions -THE UK Norway , US when the oil pollution 
materializes . 
8 
 
3)To use the outcome of two items above as a basis to examine the 
current domestic law in China on the liability concerning offshore oil 
pollution , especially  in light of the 2011 Bohai Bay oil spill .  
4 )The need, if any, to improve existing  liability regime in China  and 
make suggestions on the perfection of legal framework on oil spill 
pollution arising from offshore installment . 
2 Fragmented and incomplete international framework on 
offshore oil exploitation 
Rochette noted current international legal framework on offshore oil 
operation is fragmented and uncompleted. 5  
There are two types of international law that are most fundamental in 
this field: 
The first type is international convention. United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 6, in line with the principle of state 
sovereignty over natural resources ,7grants each nation the property 
rights to their natural resources including  offshore oil and gas 
resource .To be specific , under Articles 74 and 77 of UNCLOS  , nation 
                                                          
5
 Rochette, J. (2012), “Towards an international  regulation of offshore oil exploitation”- Report of the experts 
workshop held at the Paris Oceanographic Institute on 30 March 2012, Working Papers N°15/12, IDDRI, Paris, 
France, 18 p 
6
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 
November 1994). 
7
 Schwebel, S.M. (1963) 'The story of the U.N.'s declaration on permanent sovereignty over natural resources', 
American Bar Association Journal, 49: 463 
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can assert its right to the EEZ and Continental Shelf. Besides, offshore oil 
platform located in the EEZ and OCS falls into each nation’s jurisdiction 8 
and regulation regime9 . In addition, UNCLOS requires coastal state 
must enforce regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment including the pollution arising from offshore 
installment.10It is worthy noting that no detailed or specific standards on 
the prevention of marine pollution are stipulated under UNCLOS , it 
leaves to States to develop national laws.11UNCLOS therefore provides 
the legal basis to create an international regime for offshore oil activities 
but no such a regime has been established so far . 12The second 
category is the IMO conventions that stipulate member states’ 
responsibility to establish legal mechanism on safety , prevention and 
respond to oil spills .   
The second category is the IMO 13conventions  that stipulate member 
states’ responsibility to establish legal mechanism on safety , prevention 
and respond to oil spills . 14  
                                                          
8
 Ibid arts 60, 80 
9
 See UNCLOS, supra note 11, arts. 55–57; Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 
28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 109, 127 n.76 (2009). 
10
 See UNCLOS, supra note 11, arts. 192–237 
11
 Mikhail Kashubsky, ‘Marine Pollution from the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry: Review of Major Conventions 
and Russian Law (Part I)’ (2007) 152 Maritime Studies 1, 3 
12
 Rochette, J  n above  6.3 Ibid arts 60, 80 
13
 International Maritime Organization http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx 
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By bearing in mind that IMO's mandate is limited to shipping-related 
issues. IMO responsibility in regulating offshore activities is to the extent 
that it involves ship and/or interfere with shipping safety .Though the 
competence of IMO to stipulate conventions regarding offshore 
operation is quite restricted, 15the role of IMO is still very important as 
there are certain provisions in existed shipping conventions extending 
the application of these instruments to offshore oil platforms. 
1 )International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response 
and Cooperation,1990 (OPRC 1990) 16   
Apart from vessels , OPRC 1990 also applies to fixed or floating offshore 
installations ,17stipulating detailed provisions on dealing with pollution 
incidents and aiming at providing a global framework for international 
                                                                                                                                                                      
14
 Ibid 
15
 IMO doc LEG 99/13/1 On the 99th session , The IMO legal committee expressly states :  “UNCLOS does not 
contain any reference to IMO's role regarding offshore oil exploration and production (E&P) activities. According 
to UNCLOS, IMO's competence related to offshore oil platforms is limited to their impacts on maritime 
navigation.Annex VIII, article 2, is the only provision that mentions IMO in the Convention, indirectly 
acknowledging IMO's authority to deal with questions associated to navigation activities, but not with questions 
associated to marine environmental pollution derived from other causes. Article 60 of UNCLOS clearly 
acknowledges that maritime installations and structures are objects essentially different from vessels and are 
subject to a separate set of rules. Such understanding is reaffirmed in article 80 of UNCLOS, which regulates 
activities within the continental platform.” retrieved from 
https://www.ccaimo.mar.mil.br/sites/default/files/LEG_99-13-1_0.pdf 
16
 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (Convention on Oil 
Pollution), 1990, 30 ILM 1991 (entered into force 13 May 1995). 
17
 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation art.2(4), Nov. 30, 1990, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 102-11, 1891 U.N.T.S. 51. Also regarding the relationship between UNCLOS and these 
conventions, see Craig H. Allen, Revisiting the Thames Formula: The Evolving Role of the International Maritime 
Organization and Its Member States in  Implementing the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 10 SAN DIEGO INT’L 
L.J. 265, 271–87 (2009). 
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co-operation in combating major incidents or threats of marine 
pollution .18 The OPRC is considered to be:  
"Probably the most important international legal document that 
regulates pollution of the marine environment resulting from offshore 
oil and gas activities." 19 
2 )Regarding Safety , Chapter 7 of MARPOL 73/78, regulation 39, sets 
out special requirements for fixed or floating platforms. In addition , The 
code of Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units 
(2009 MODU Code) 20 supersedes the 1989 MODU Code ，provides an 
international standards on  "design criteria, construction standards and 
other safety measures for mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) so as 
to minimize the risks to such units, to the personnel onboard, and to the 
environment" .21  
There are also several IMO guidelines regulating personnels who work 
on oil platform such as "Recommendations on Training of Personnel on 
Mobile Offshore Units” 22and “Convention on Standards for Training, 
                                                          
18
 Brief introduction on OPRC from IMO 
website .http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Oil-Poll
ution-Preparedness,-Response-and-Co-operation-(OPRC).aspx 
19
 Mikhail Kashubsky, n above 151 
20
 See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, at 2, 
IMO Assemb. Res. A.1023(26) (Jan. 18, 2010) 
21
 8 Ibid., Article 2 
22
 A21/res. 891. 
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Certification and Watch Standing (STCW)”23 . Apart from regulating 
crews behaviour on board ship, The latter is equally applicable to 
offshore industry ,24 however there are still many gaps to address the 
behaviour of drilling crews . 
3 ) Regarding liability and compensation regime ,though there were 
quite a lot attempts had been made , so far there is no specific 
convention come into force .  
The first attempt is “Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed 
Mineral Resources” (CLEE) 25which stipulated the scope of liability, the 
principle of strict liability and mandatory insurance. Although this was 
adopted by a conference in London in 1976, it has never come into 
effect due to no sufficient number of ratifications. 
Following CLEE, there were also attempts on “Rio Draft Convention on 
Offshore Mobile Craft”26 and a further revised  “Sydney Draft” 27. 
However because United States changed its initial supportive position 
                                                          
23
 Adopted July 7, 1978, entered into force April 28, 1984 
24
 This Convention was the first to establish basic requirements for training, certification and watch keeping for 
seafarers at an international level. The IMO website notes that previous standards for such activities were 
established by individual governments without referenced to practices in other countries "as a result standards 
and procedures varied widely, even though shipping is the most international of all industries".(Wylie 
Spicer ,2012) 
25
 Adopted on 1 May 1977, London, United Kingdom 
26
 Draft International Convention on Offshore Mobile Craft, IMO Doc LEG/34/6(b), 19 December 1977 (not in 
force).   
27
 Draft Convention on Offshore Mobile Craft 1994, (not in force). 
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and challenged the need for a comprehensive international treaty on 
offshore units, IMO chose to remove the subject from their respective 
work programmes . 28  
The most recent attempt to fill the gap in Liability and compensation 
regime in oil pollution arising from offshore installment is the 
Indonesia’s proposal in September 2010. 
The explosion on the Montara wellhead platform which located in 
Australia economic exclusive zone (EEZ) happened on 21 August 2009, 
oil slicks and sheen spread across 5,800 square miles and had entered 
Indonesian waters of Timor Sea .Though identifying oil spill source is not 
an easy task to accomplish and it is more difficult to evaluate the oil 
blowout damage , Government of Indonesia is reported 29 to have 
claimed $2.5 billion for damage to marine environment in Timor Sea and 
socio-economic loss of community on Rote Island off Indonesia  (the 
closest village to the Montara oil rigs) .30 
 
The rig and platform are owned and operated by PTTEP Australasia,31 
no proper insurance is bought by this company and so far no 
compensation has been made .The wider concern from Indonesia is that 
even if there were appropriate insurance arranged by the oil company, 
the insurance companies may have limitation of liability, the cap is 
                                                          
28
 Kashubsky, above n 14, 5 
29
 Presentation of Youna Lyons to the September 2011 Bali Conference 
30
 MO DOC LEG 97/14/1   Refer to “The total catch of fishermen in  Kupang, the closest Indonesian village to 
the affected area, has drastically decreased in the  period following the Montara incident. A reduction in the 
production of seaweed in the affected  coastal area during the period from September 2009 to January 2010 
has also been observed 
31
 It is a subsidiary of the  Thai -owned PTT Exploration and Production  Public Company Limited 
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usually decided by national regulation of respective country or dealt 
with in regional arrangements. The deficiency presented by this case is 
,according to the Indonesian delegation, is a lack of 
internationally-agreed, uniform mechanism to address the 
consequences of all incidents of this nature . Indonesia therefore 
proposed the Legal Committee of IMO to establish a international legal 
regime to regulate the liability and compensation for oil pollution arising 
from drilling activities in connection with exploration and exploitation of 
oil and gas. Three sessions of the Legal Committee have been hold and 
extensive discussions have been concentrated on the two main issues -- 
procedural and substantive. 
Procedure issue  
IMO Assembly (hold every two years) adopts the Strategic Plan for the 
Organization (covering a six-year period), and all new proposals are 
required to be in line with the current Strategic plan . 
In LEG 97 , it recommended that the Organization's Strategic Direction 
7.2 should be revised to read as follows: 
"IMO will focus on reducing and eliminating any adverse impact by 
shipping or by offshore oil exploration and exploitation activities on the 
environment by ... developing effective measures for mitigating and 
responding to the impact on the environment caused by shipping 
incidents and operational pollution from ships and liability and 
15 
 
compensation issues connected with trans boundary pollution damage 
resulting from offshore oil exploration and exploitation activities." 
However it is obviously not the case for Indonesia’s proposal fits the 
strategic direction ,and the request  to revise the direction to include 
offshore oil and gas activities in IMO’s mandate was blocked by member 
states, including the THE UK, Norway, the US and Canada. 
Substantive issue 
There are views both in and against Indonesia‘s proposal. 
The opinions in favor of establishing a uniform international convention 
on pollution arising from offshore oil operation are as below:32 
(i) In light of Montara incident, it is time to establish a legal framework in 
case the next serious incident occurs; 
(ii) There is no better forum than IMO to deal with this issue given its 
characteristics, experience and expertise; 
(iii)it is notable that there is no boundary for oil pollution  and  the 
damage may spread across countries  , without a international 
mechanism , it is very difficult for every country to deal with it  on its 
own . 
 
The arguments against the proposal are following:33 
                                                          
32
 Rochette, J  above n  8 p 
33
 Ibid 
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(i)According to UNCLOS, IMO's competence related to offshore oil 
platforms is limited to their impacts on maritime navigation, 34and 
regarding marine environment pollution, the Article 1 of IMO 
Convention expressly restricts IMO's competence to pollution caused by 
ships . 
(ii)The proposal to request IMO duplicating the liability conventions 
applicable to oil pollutions caused by ships to offshore sector is not 
feasible , as damage of oil pollution caused by ships usually has an 
international impact and may potentially influence any country while 
unlike shipping  has a global reach and impact  , due to the location of  
oil rigs , the oil pollution from offshore facilities rarely involves several 
countries .Substantial differences exist between shipping and offshore 
sectors should be noted . 
(iii)  The issue discussed is governed by national legislations, pursuant 
to the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS)  
(iv) Another fundamental thing is the lack of an international technical 
structure to define common safety standards. Legal committee stated 
“Only an international technical structure capable of establishing safety 
standards uniform to all platforms in the world and also capable of 
                                                          
34
 Ibid 
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certifying and inspecting these structures would provide the necessary 
effectiveness to this system based upon the objective liability of the 
operators”. 35 
(v) Biliteral or regional agreement is considered to be a better solution 
regarding the pollution rising from offshore facilities. 
On 20th April 2012. The IMO refused to include offshore drilling on its 
work agenda and considered no compelling need to establish an 
international convention on this issue. 
Regional Regulations 
Though it is the failure that Indonesia ‘s proposal to build a 
comprehensive liability convention regulating oil pollution from offshore 
facility , IMO still plays an important role to stimulate the emergence of 
bilateral or regional arrangements.  
Because of the deficiencies in the international law , the regional 
regulations have played an important role in filling gaps on offshore oil 
operation regime .Examples include the 1992 Convention for the 
protection of the marine environment of the North-East Atlantic (the 
OSPAR Convention) ,Protocol for the protection of the Mediterranean 
sea against pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the 
continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil ,the 1978 Regional 
                                                          
35
 IMO DOC LEG 99/13/1  ,7p 
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Convention for Cooperation of the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Pollution(1978 Kuwait Convention) and the1989 
Kuwait Protocol ，Convention for co-operation in the protection and 
development of the marine and coastal environment of the West and 
Central African Region . 36 
To sum up, there are several international conventions which have 
connections with offshore related risks, however the focus of most of 
these conventions such as UNCLOS and MARPOL 73/78 is on safety, and 
little concern has been given on liability and compensation regime. The 
absence of any international regime to cover oil spills rising from 
offshore oil operation activities is an obvious deficiency in international 
law. Though several attempts have been made to establish a uniformed 
liability convention. It ended up that oil pollution liability rising from 
offshore facilities is still largely governed by domestic law. 
3 Liability Regimes  
The origin of the international liability regime on marine oil pollution is 
the Torrey Canyon disaster of 1967.37 Basis the lessons learned from 
                                                          
36
 For more details on these regional conventions , refer to Zhiguo Gao (2000) environmental regulation of the 
oil and gas industries , Journal for the center for Energy , Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy , Vol 2-11 
Article  ;M.Kashubsky n .above  1-11 ；Rochette, J  n above 10-11 
37
 Torrey Canyon was a Suezmax oil tanker loaded 120,000 tons of crude oil. She was shipwrecked off the 
western coast of Cornwall, England in March 1967, causing an environmental disaster.The Torrey Canyon oil spill 
is one of the world's most serious oil spills that about 50 miles (80 km) of French and 120 miles (190 km) of 
Cornish coast were contaminated and around 15,000 sea birds were killed, along with huge numbers of marine 
organisms, before the 270 square miles (700 km2) slick dispersed. 
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this disaster, it was the catalyst for work on liability and compensation 
on international level. The outcome was the creation of the 1969 and 
197 conventions and the IOPC compensation regime.38So far, there have 
been several global international agreements on civil liability on oil spills 
from ships. And the primary conventions are the Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage 1992 (CLC 92) and the complementary International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Oil 
Pollution Damage 1992 (Fund Convention). However the ship source oil 
pollution presents different issues to one presented by offshore 
operation activities .Neither of these two conventions applies to oil rigs 
which fall outside the scope of CLC 92 convention objects  - ships 
carrying oil as cargo that are on a voyage . 
Generally, there is a lack of comprehensive international mechanism to 
address the oil pollution damage arising from offshore installment. The 
main reasons for the absence of a binding uniform approach are two 
fold :The first reason is that compared with the oil pollution arising from 
vessels , there is quite low chance for the oilwell blowout incidents 
incurred , thanks to the cutting -edge offshore technology and the well 
-built prevention regulations .39 Though there are few cases concerning 
                                                          
38
 Micheal .G.Faure , Hui Wang , Civil Liability and Compensation for Marine Pollution - Lessons to Be Learned for 
Offshore Oil Spills , supra note 82, at 243 
39
 Ibid 
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offshore oil spill damage , the possibility always exists since the risk 
involved can never be eliminated the alarm of which has been ringed by 
both Horizon deepwater disaster and Baohai 2011 oil spill . The second 
reason is the fact that the majority of offshore operations take place on 
the continental shelf which falls the scope of the national jurisdiction of 
the coastal States, therefore National laws are the redress method. 
As mentioned above, it is the responsibility of the individual state to 
stipulate regulations regarding liability regime , therefore in this thesis 
three jurisdiction, namely the UK, Norway and the USA were chosen to 
illustrate how domestic law stipulates the liability and compensation. 
Since these three nations are the most characterized ones with strong 
offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation interest , and 
comparatively mature liability regimes have been built up through 
experience and lessons accumulated during decade development of 
offshore industry . The three given countries are good examples of a 
regulatory and liability regime that protects the environment while 
ensuring economic growth. 
Before comparing the differences and similarities among three 
countries , it is necessary to have an general view of liability regime in 
each nation .  
21 
 
3.1 THE UK Regime  
Overview  
The offshore oil and gas operation activities in the UK are concentrated 
in the North Sea. In light of rapid growth on offshore industry in the 
North Sea, the UK authority passed Petroleum Act 1998 - the main body 
of legislation on offshore drilling which establishes the regulatory regime 
on oil and gas exploration and production in THE UK. Under THE UK 
Petroleum law, all rights to "search for, bore for and get" petroleum are 
vested in the Crown.   
A licensing regime was also built by The Petroleum Act 1998. In THE UK 
licensing system, before being granted the license, sufficient funds are 
requested to be provided by licensee in order to cover the liabilities for 
damage caused by any oil pollution.  In addition, Licensees must keep 
the Secretary of State and the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change fully indemnified against all claims that may be brought by third 
parties in connection with the license.  
Currently the role of stipulating offshore regulations of THE UK is spread 
over three authorities:  
1) The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) : This 
department is mainly responsibility for granting exploration license and 
enforcing environmental legislations . 
22 
 
2) The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) : HSE is the national 
independent watchdog for work-related health, safety and illness . 
40The specific issues of offshore oil and gas industry is regulated by its 
Energy Division .Their mission “to protect people's health and safety by 
ensuring risks in the changing workplace are properly controlled”.41 
3)Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) ：MCA is responsible to 
implement maritime safety policy and response to pollution from 
offshore installations. 
Liability Regime  
Concerning an oil pollution incident within United Kingdom territory, the 
primarily legislations concerning the liability are as below : 
1)the Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement 1974("OPOL")  
2) the Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) Regulations 2009 
3) Tort law  
OPOL  
OPOL was initially drafted as an interim measure during the negotiation 
of a regional Convention of Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral 
Resources (CLEE). However since the nine participating States failed to 
reach an agreement, it was ungratified in the end . But the THE UK 
                                                          
40
 http://www.hse.gov.the UK /aboutus/ 
41
 Ibid 
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Government remained their interests toward it and regarded the OPOL 
Agreement to be a efficient mechanism to establish the strict liability 
regime .Therefore OPOL became a primarily redness concerning the oil 
pollution arising from offshore facilities within THE UK territory. 
In THE UK , the precondition to be granted a license of offshore 
operation is to become a member of Offshore Pollution Liability 
Agreement of 1975 (OPOL) .However it should be noted that OPOL is a 
voluntary oil pollution compensation scheme funded by THE UK offshore 
operators instead of a legislation . The cover provided is ‘direct loss or 
damage by contamination which results from a discharge of oil’ from 
offshore installments within the jurisdiction of member state . 42 
Though the nature of OPOL is a voluntary agreement , the relevant 
government department for offshore regulatory matters, DECC requires 
all operators to have signed up to OPOL and the sufficient  evidence of 
financial responsibility .  In this way , OPOL becomes a single-tier 
system funded by oil industry .  If the third party liability under the 
OPOL scheme for some reason does not materialize, or there are 
                                                          
42
 Apart from THE UK , there are other eight member states , namely Denmark, Germany, France, Netherlands, 
Norway, the Isle of Man and the Faroe Islands. 
24 
 
defaults on that payment, the entire industry has a collective 
responsibility to meet those payments. 43 
The key element of OPOL is imposing the strict liability (with certain 
exemptions) on operator solely . Any Person who sustains Pollution 
Damage (defined as “ direct loss or damage by contamination which 
results from a discharge of oil.”) can directly claim operator .In addition , 
public authority is also entitled to claim the operator concerning the  
remedial measures which is defined as “prevent, mitigate or eliminate 
pollution  damage following such Discharge of Oil or to remove or 
neutralize the oil involved in such discharge.” 
Though OPOL directs liability to operator, it remains silent on the 
allocation of risk between operator and contractor, leaving the issue of 
apportionment to the contract between two parties without prejudice 
to operator’s right of recourse. 
The current liability cap is $250 million (remedial measures up to $125 
million per incident and pollution damage up to $125 million per 
incident) . If the damage exceeds $250 million, OPOL does not prevent 
victims from seeking alternative redness through general tort law .This 
                                                          
43
 THE UK  parliament ,THE UK  Deepwater Drilling - Implications of the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill - Energy and 
Climate Change Contents -  Liability and Compensation  available at http://www.publications.parliament.the 
UK /pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmenergy/450/45007.htm#note125(last visited 20.Sep.2013) 
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equally applies to the damage or loss beyond the scope of OPOL 
definition.  
Another feature of OPOL is rapid payment - under this agreement there 
is no need for legal action .As long as the claimant provides the 
documents required concerning the claims which are recoverable under 
OPOL, the operator should make full payment subject to the agreement. 
OPOL facilitates prompt settlement by avoiding the lengthy and 
complicated legal process. 
Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) Regulations 
2009 
These Regulations implement the EC Environmental Liability Directive in 
THE UK. It enforces strict liability for prevention and remediation of 
environmental damage to ‘biodiversity’, water and land from specified 
activities and remediation of environmental damage. However this 
regulation is only limit to Pay costs claimed by the authority in relation 
to "environmental damage" excluding the any third party claim .44 
Tort Law  
As mentioned above, tort law provides another layer of protection for 
the offshore oil pollution victims when their damage or loss can not be 
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recovered under OPOL or the amount of damage exceeds the limitation 
of the agreement. Provided damage is reasonably foreseeable, there is 
no limitation on liability under tort law, however pure economic loss 
generally not recoverable. 
3.2 US Regime  
Overview  
The American offshore oil and gas operation is concentrated in the US 
Gulf of Mexico. In 2012, federal leases in the Gulf of Mexico produced 
463 million barrels (73.6×106 m3) of oil, which made up 19.5% of all US 
oil production that year, and it is estimated that oil production from the 
Gulf of Mexico will increase to 686 million barrels (109.1×106 m3) per 
year by 2013.45   
In the US, the legal framework governing activities on the Outer 
Continental Shelf (OCS )is comprised of an uncoordinated collection of 
numerous laws enacted by Congress over more than 200 years. 46The 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 47is the primary legislation 
regulating U.S. offshore regions, which provides federal jurisdiction for 
all offshore lands beyond the state limit .Apart from OCSLA, there are 
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various regulations stipulating specific issues of operations in the 
offshore oil and gas industry such as Oil and Gas Royalty Management 
Act, which governs lease and royalty agreements. 
The main governing bodies on offshore oil operation activities are as 
below: 
1) Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of 
Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), which manage offshore 
oil production operations, in responsible of leasing offshore sites, 
collecting the royalties due the government, and permitting of 
operations.  
2) Department of energy (DOE), which handles the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve, conducts energy research, and gathers and analyses energy 
industry data. 
3)  U.S. Coast Guard is the main governing body to perform oil 
response, in charge of cleaning up. 
4) Environment Protection Agency (EPA) is the main governing body to 
provide oversight for environmental, health, and safety issues. 
Liability Regime  
In THE USA, The Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA 90), paired with the The 
Clean Water Act 1972 (CWA) and state law, provides the legal 
framework for oil spill liability. 
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OPA 90  
The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) came into effect in August 1990 largely in 
response to the legal issues presented by the Exxon Valdez oil spill.  
This incident spilled 260,000 to 750,000 barrels (41,000 to 119,000 m3) 
of crude oil into Prince William Sound and was regarded as one of the 
most devastating human-caused environmental disasters. 48 
OPA 90 is a comprehensive statute that covers liability and 
compensation concerning all types of oil spills, covering oil spills from 
both the vessel resource and offshore facilities. 
Under OPA, the “responsible party” is strictly liable(with specific 
exceptions ) for the damage and loss caused by oil pollution  .The 
“responsible party” for an offshore facility is defined to be  
        “the lessee or permittee of the area in which the facility is 
located or the holder of a right of use and easement granted 
under applicable State law or the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1301-1356) for the area in which the 
facility is located ” 
The compensation covered by OPA 90 is mainly two types (section 1002 
(b) of OPA 90): 
                                                          
48
 "Frequently Asked Questions About the Spill". Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. Archived from the 
originalon June 30, 2007. Retrieved September 11, 2013. 
29 
 
1) Removal costs - It refers to the costs of removal and the costs “to 
prevent, minimize, or mitigate” oil pollution .The removal cost can be 
claimed by both federal, state authority and any person who took 
actions. Unlike setting $23.5 million as the cleaning up fee limitation 
for vessel source pollution, there is no cap for removal cost incurred 
concerning the oil pollution arising from offshore facilities. 
2) Compensation for damages natural resources, property , revenue and 
economic loss incurred .OPA sets clear that environmental damage is 
recoverable by a United States trustee .In addition, it worth noting that 
under OPA 90 , the pure economic loss incurred by private party is also 
recoverable .The liability  limitation for damage concerning oil pollution 
arising from offshore facility is $75 million. 
The right to limit liability concerning offshore oil pollution damage 
should be deprived, if there is gross negligence or willful misconduct or a 
violation of some regulations.  
The important point to note under OPA 90 scheme is that it requires the 
responsible party to establish evidence of financial responsibility for 
potential liabilities .33 U.S.C section 2716 (e) stipulates that in the case 
of an offshore facility , the amount of financial responsibility varies  
from $10 million up to $150 million “based on the relative operational , 
environmental , human health and other risks by the quantity or quality 
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of the oil ”and the location of the facility ,(33 U.S.C section 2726 
(c)(1)(c) ). Oil Spill Financial Responsibility (OSFR) is set in order to 
implement the authority of OPA 90. 
Another point worthy noting is under OPA scheme, The Oil Spill Liability 
Trust Fund (OSLTF) is set up as a federally administered trust fund used 
to pay cost concerning the federal and state oil spill removal activities, 
costs incurred by federal , state and Indian tribe trustees for natural 
resource damage assessment , and unpaid damage claims . 49This fund 
is mainly financed by Barrel tax which is collected from oil produced in 
or imported to United State. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (clean water act ) 
The Act imposes liability for the costs of the removal, as well as for 
natural resource damages however claims for private loss are not 
included . The key feature of Clean Water Act is It also imposes 
administrative and criminal penalties for unlawful discharges and for 
failure to carry out orders issued under the Act. To be specific : 
1)Administrative penality : strict liability for Administrative penality is 
imposed on the polluter and the maximum amount is $190,000 . 
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2) Criminal Penalties : The responsible party may face a fine varying from 
not more than than$25,000 per day to $50,000 per day depending it is a 
negligent violation or not . A prison sentence may be imposed as well . 
State law  
OPA 90 does not preclude state action , therefore the damage exceeding 
the OPA limitation can be claimed through general tort law . There is no 
cap under tort law , however it should be noted that pure economic loss 
is normally unrecoverable .In addition, Under US general tort law 
regime ,  the responsible party may be imposed punitive damages 
based on fault liability . 
3.3 Norway Regime  
OVERVIEW  
Norwegian offshore industry has over 40 years of production history 
since the first oil rig on the Norwegian continental shelf began to 
produce on June 15, 1971, at the Ekofisk field . 
A comprehensive, well -designed legal framework has been established 
by Norwegian law maker to stimulate the oil industry interest in 
exploring in further offshore areas while to protect the environment at 
the same time.50 
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In Norway, both Constitution from the top-tier and Pollution Control 
Act51  as a status impose a duty to avoid pollution and stipulate 
provisions on general protection of the environment and natural 
resources .The Norwegian offshore petroleum sector is characterized by 
a high activity level and a strong sense of safety  
Though Norway is also a member state of OPOL, unlike THE UK applying 
the whole scheme into all offshore operators within THE UK territory, 
the OPOL agreement applies in Norway to one supply pipeline only. The 
issues on offshore facilities under Norwegian operation license are 
subject to national liability and compensation regime and the 
jurisdiction of the Norwegian courts. 
The Petroleum Activities Act (Nov. 1996, No. 72) (PAA)52 is the primary 
legislation regulating the offshore oil operation activities in Norway. A 
licensing system is regulated under this act. 
Governing bodies 
The Storting (Parliament) is top authority in responsible for the 
framework of Norwegian petroleum activities , and the authority  for 
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implementing the various roles concerning offshore oil operation 
activities is spread among : 
1) Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE), the primary body for 
resource management 
2) Ministry of Labor, it is charge of health, the working environment and 
safety. 
3) Ministry of Environment, which is responsible for the external 
environment. 
4) Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), NPD is subordinate to the 
MPE. Playing an important role as advisory body to the MPE. 
Liability regime  
Chapter 7 of Petroleum Act stipulates detailed provisions related to the 
oil spill liability arsing from offshore installment.  
The licensees are hold strictly responsible (with limited exceptions)for 
the pollution damage from an offshore facility (art 7-3,para1 ) . Under 
Norwegian Regime, three key elements should be taken into 
consideration when assessing the scope of the oil pollution liability: 
1) Functional scope - PA section 7-1 
Subject to PA section 7-1, the pollution damages can be divided into two 
categories depending on the function .The first type is   “damage or 
loss caused by pollution as a consequence of effluence or discharge of 
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petroleum from a facility, including a well”. The second type is “costs of 
reasonable measures to avert or limit such damage or such loss, as well 
as damage or loss as a consequence of such measures” It should be 
noted that PA dose not further specify the damage/loss and who could 
file the claim .However, PA stipulates it clear that “damage or loss 
incurred by fishermen as a consequence of reduced possibilities for 
fishing” is recoverable.(further discussion below ) 
2) Geographical scope - PA section 7-2 
Further to section 1-4, PA section 7-2, para 1 stipulates pollution damage 
that takes place “in Norway or inside the outer limits of the Norwegian 
continental shelf or affects a Norwegian vessel, Norwegian hunting or 
catching equipment or Norwegian facility in adjacent sea areas” , 
chapter  7 also applies to “when the damage occurs in onshore or 
offshore territory belonging to a state which has acceded to the Nordic 
Convention on Environment Protection.”(PA section 7-2 para 2) 
3) Economic scope – PA section 7-3 
Under PA ,The principle rule is there is no limitation for liability 
concerning the oil pollution arising offshore facilities .And it is strict 
liability for polluters on the damages ,however discretionary reduction 
of liability is available provided “it is demonstrated that an inevitable 
event of nature, act of war, exercise of public authority or a similar force 
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majeure event has contributed to a considerable degree to the damage 
or its extent under circumstances which are beyond the control of the 
liable party .”(PA Section 7-3, para 3)  
The channeling of responsibility is regulated in PA section 7-4, claims to 
the licensee can be only filed pursuant to the PA, and the listed parties 
are shielded from liability. However If the licensee fails to pay the 
compensation, claims against the party that has caused the damage are 
allowed provided “to the same extent as the licensee may bring action 
for recourse against the party causing the damage.”(PA section 7-4 para 
3&4). 
PA further stipulates the licensee’s right of recourse in Section 7-5. The 
licensee is not allowed to claim recourse for damage that is exempt from 
liability under the liability channeling provisions, unless the person “or 
someone in his service has acted willfully or by gross negligence”. 
Unlike THE UK and US regime where fisher’s interest is not sorted out 
separately , special rules for the compensation of Norwegian fisher are 
set in Chapter 8 of the PAA stipulates  .Strict liability of licensees is also 
applied on  financial losses suffered by fishermen without liability cap .  
Penal provision is regulated under section 10-17, “Willful or negligent 
violation of provisions or decisions issued in or pursuant to this Act shall 
be punishable by fines or imprisonment for up to 3 months.  In 
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particularly aggravating circumstances, imprisonment for up to 2 years 
may be imposed” 
A point to note is Proof of insurance is required as a precondition to get 
the operation license. According to the Regulations to the Petroleum 
Activities Act 53stipulate that “the license shall provide reasonable 
insurance cover” (art. 73, para. 3). However no specific amount is set.  
3.4 Common Denominators & Differences  
From the above analysis on each national‘s liability regime, it is clear 
there are both common characters shared and differences existed 
among the three given jurisdictions.  
To be specific, the common denominators are including: 
 polluter pays principle  
The most significant element in environmental Liability regime is 
“polluter pays principle” -whoever responsible for damage to the 
environment should bear the costs associated with it .Its main function 
is to internalize the social costs borne by the public authorities for 
pollution prevention and control. 54  Integrating this principle into 
offshore oil pollution liability regime can set a clear and appropriate 
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deterrent mechanism that reflects the potentially hazardous nature of 
the petroleum industry and motivate the potential polluter to weigh the 
impact on environment more during their decision making. The “polluter 
pays principle” is followed by US, THE UK and Norway concerning oil 
pollution liability arising from offshore installment and is supported by 
strong civil penalty regime.  
 Channeling of responsibility 
A question is raised when applying the polluter pays principle - who 
should be identified as the polluter concerning the oil pollution rising 
from offshore pollution. Since offshore oil operation activity normally 
involves various parties: licensee, operator, contractor, and 
subcontractor.  Depending upon the facts, the cause of an oil spill can 
be traced back to the responsible of operator, the drilling contractor, the 
facility manufacturer, or a combination of them .It is true that the 
broader the definition of polluter, the larger the potential pool of solvent 
defendants; however, the larger the pool of defendants the harder to 
know who to be sued. It would be very complicated and time 
-consuming for plaintiff to know who the defendant is. The difficulty to 
identify responsible party polluter can be solved by channeling of 
responsibility. 
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Channeling of responsibility stems from nuclear convention. It means 
the responsible party of damage is limited to the certain statutory 
channeled party , excluding the other parties from liability regardless of 
their contribution to the damage . Professor Hui Wang noted “it is a 
deviation from the general principle of tort law that the tortfeasor who 
has caused damage should be held liable.” 
The channeling of responsibility in oil pollution liability regime was firstly 
adopted by 1969 conference .Instead of holding the tortfeasor liable, the 
registered shipowner is exclusively liable for the damage regardless of 
fault. 55Then its influence is extended to the liability regime for oil 
pollution rising from offshore facilities as well. 
The importance of channeling of responsibility in offshore oil pollution 
liability regime is that Similar to strict liability (it is discussed later), 
channeling of liability simplifies litigation by directing the the 
responsibility to specific party and making it quite clear to plaintiff who 
should be sued. The broadness of Channeling responsibility varies 
among the three given jurisdiction: 
1) In Norway, Norwegian Petroleum Act has specific provision on the 
channeling of responsibility .Section 7-4 para 1 stipulates “The liability of 
a licensee for pollution damage may only be claimed pursuant to the 
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rules of this Act.” It is designed to protect the licensee against claims 
under the general principles of tort law.56 Para 2 is concerning the 
channeling part , which expressly states the parties excluded from this 
provision should be protected from liabilities .Para 3 stipulates the 
damaged party may bring action against the perpetrator of the damage 
only when licensee failed to pay .Norwegian Petroleum Act further 
stipulates the limited recourse right of the licensee , a licensee is not 
allowed to claim recourse for damage that is exempt from liability under 
the liability channeling provisions unless the pollution damages are 
caused willfully or by negligence of the person in question. (Section 7-5) 
2 )Turning to US , Nathan Richardson comments that OPA 90 also 
“channels” liability of  oil spills  .However unlike providing a 
comprehensive provision of channeling liability , OPA 90  only specifies 
exactly who is to be treated without listing the parties excluded from the 
responsibility .57 According to OPA 90 Section 6-5, the responsibility of 
offshore oil pollution is directly imposed on lessee or permittee. And in 
the case of Deep-water Horizon, the holder of the drilling permit, the 
lessee of the Macondo Prospect area BP is a responsible party.58    
                                                          
56
 Hui Wang 2011 ,205P 
57
 Nathan Richardson, ‘Deepwater Horizon and the Patchwork of Oil Spill Liability Law’ (2010) Resources for the 
Future <http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/RFF-BCK-Richardson-OilLiability.pdf> at 10 Oct  2013 
58
 Ibid 
40 
 
however unlike Norwegian regime where “The liability of a licensee for 
pollution damage may only be claimed pursuant to Petroleum Act” ,  
the channeling of responsibility under US liability regime is relatively 
limited and may be undermined as it is open to claimants to pursue 
alternative remedies outside OPA 90 , independently of the provisions of 
OPA 90.  
3) Under THE UK and OPOL convention, like US there is no evident 
channeling responsibility clause however the channeling technique is 
used by stipulating the operator59 is hold solely responsible for the 
acceptance and payment of all claims arising from the offshore oil spill.  
It is also worth noting OPOL is not a legislation instead it is a voluntary 
industry compensation agreement scheme, aiming to provide prompt 
compensation mechanism . Companies are jointly and severally in case 
of insolvency. 
Also OPOL does not prevent the victim to get alternative redness from 
the real wrongdoer through tort law, which is quite similar with US 
approach   .   
Though there are quite a lot discussions on the present allocation of 
liability between parties (contractor subcontractor and operators )under 
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contract law and the issue of Contractual indemnities60, the primary 
responsibility is imposed to the “operator (or licensee)”by national 
legislations through channeling of responsibility provision or using 
channeling technique , which is justified as the operator benefits from 
the exploitation and knows most of the facility and is in the best position 
to take preventive measures . After all, it is the operator that has control 
over all information and decision-making relating to the well and 
associated risks, and is responsible to the government for compliance 
with its regulatory requirements.61 
 Strict liability  
Strict liability imposes liability for harm suffered on responsible party 
without requiring proof of negligence. Daniel B. Shilliday comments “The 
rationale for strict liability is that it shifts the loss from the innocent to 
the responsible State which, in view of its presumed knowledge of the 
hazard created, is considered to be in a better position to decide 
whether or not the benefits of the activity are likely to outweigh its 
potential costs and provides a powerful incentive for the prevention of 
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accidents.” 62Compared with the negligence approach, the advantage of 
strict liability is that it simplifies litigation and provides a fairly better 
protection toward the oil pollution victims. 
In addition, strict liability normally goes with a rule of reversal of the 
burden of proof of the injurer's fault .In other words, the burden proof 
of fault is not relied on the claimant under strict liability scheme, which 
tends to favor the claimant since it makes their case somewhat easier 
than it might have been had it been necessary to prove intention or 
recklessness on the part of the operators.63 
In all three given jurisdictions, strict liability is imposed for damage 
concerning offshore oil pollution .It is also worth noting that strict 
liability mechanism cannot supplant legal liability, but it does provide a 
means of dealing with claims that is simpler and more satisfactory to the 
claimant  . 
 Exoneration from liability 
Though strict liability principle is imposed on responsible party in all 
three given jurisdiction, however specific defenses are also stipulated to 
exempt him from this. 
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1)Subject to OPA Section 2703 , The responsible party is not liable if the 
discharge is “solely” caused by: “(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) 
an act or omission of a third party other than an employee, agent or 
contracting party of the responsible party (4) any combination” 
2) Turning THE UK ,OPOL Clause IV-b stipulates “No obligation shall arise 
hereunder with respect to Remedial Measures and/or Pollution Damage 
arising from an Incident if the Incident: 1)  an act of war, 2 )was wholly 
caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by a 
third Person; 3 )was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful 
act of any Government or other authority in compliance with conditions 
4) resulted wholly or partially caused by an act or omission done with 
intent to cause damage by a third Person 
3) Norwegian Petroleum Act provides legal basis for discretionary 
reduction of liability. As per PA Section7-4 para 3 , the polluter’s liability  
may be reduced “to the extent it is reasonable” in cases of “a force 
majeure or the exercise of public authority” contributing “to a 
considerable degree to the damage or its extent,” And to what extent 
the reduction can be given depending on “the scope of the activity, the 
situation of the party that has sustained damage and the opportunity for 
taking out insurance on both sides” . 
 Oil spill financial solvency  
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A strict liability rule can be considered efficient only if there is no 
insolvency risk. 64Indeed, without sufficient solvency, the liability regime 
faces under deterrence. 
The three given jurisdictions all request the operator /licensee to 
provide sufficient proof of finance assurance in order to demonstrate 
the risks of the operation have been appropriately estimated and that 
the financial mechanisms are in place to meet to cover major incidents.  
The proof of finance is the precondition to grant offshore drilling license 
in all three nations .When evaluating the existing financial security 
instruments, the financial ceilings and complemented risk-coverage 
instruments also need to be taken into consideration. 
1) US stipulates the amount of such a financial guarantee based on 
Worst case scenario. 65It is assumed that the worst spill will last 4 days 
and total spill is between 1,000 and35, 000 barrels of oil. Responsible 
parties for offshore facilities in federal waters must demonstrate $35 
million financial responsibility, as any volume greater than 105,000 
barrels; the cap is $150 million. (33 U.S.C. 2716(c)).    
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 2) OPOL requires all members to submit evidence of financial 
responsibility. Depending on the location of the well, its depth, water 
depth and the geological environment , using 'worst case scenario' 
approach, four levels of the financial responsibility have been set: Band 
1: US$250 million, Band 2: US$375million, Band 3: US$500 million and 
Band 4: US$750 million.66 
3) The Norwegian Petroleum Activities Act requires operators to have in 
place insurance that covers damage to facilities; pollution damage; and 
wreck removal and ensure that its contractors and employees are also 
sufficiently covered .The MPE may consent to the licensee using another 
form of security arrangement. 
It can be seen from above , that the basis for the proof of financial 
solvency varies from each nation , US is based on worst Worst case 
scenario  , THE UK approach is more flexible and the definition of 
appropriate ‘financial capacity’ is estimated case by case , while Norway 
sets the specific requirements are for insurance to at least cover the 
items listed . 
In order to achieve efficient financial solvency, Both THE UK and THE 
USA allow a set of alternative or complementary financial instruments at 
operator’s flexibility and choice.  
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The various methods are as below  
1) Insurance / warranties and guaranties, 
2) Self-insurance and private funds, 
3) Public funds. 
By contrast, in Norway insurance is preferred and using another form of 
security agreement needs the consent from MPE. 
Differences  
 The first difference is in the liability cap  
It can be easily seen from the above discussion that: 
1) There is no limited liability for clean-up in Norway and THE USA .The 
remedial measures cap in THE UK is $125 million per incident. 
2) Regarding the damage, THE UK OPOL sets pollution damage limitation 
up to $125 million per incident, and under OPA 90 the liability limitation 
for damage concerning oil pollution arising from offshore facility is $75 
million. By contrast, no limitation has been set in Norway. 
As to the UK and the USA which set liability limitation, a question may 
rise here whether cap fails to adequately reflect the potential damages. 
There is voice to lift it as the cap may discourage the operator‘s 
incentives to adopt cost-effective safety precautions and it provides 
inadequate compensation for damages.67 In addition, like what the 
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Deepwater Horizon incident has demonstrated, the limitation can be 
illusory because it does not take much, in terms of 'bad behavior', for 
those caps no longer to be available to the polluter.68 
The main differences in liability regime of the three given jurisdiction is 
on the scope of compensation. 
Generally speaking, the responsible party for a pollution incident may, in 
any given jurisdiction, face the following liabilities: 
(a) The costs of cleaning up  
Cleanup costs are often directly correlated with spill impact, particularly 
shoreline impact, so that reducing the spill impact can result in reducing 
the spill response costs (Elkin, 1998b,c). Efficient cleaning up can 
significantly eliminates the damages to natural resource and reduces the 
amount of property damage claims.  
 (b) The costs of restoring the natural resources 
 It is obvious that oil pollution can cause various damages to the 
environment including deterioration, destruction or loss of natural 
resources. As mentioned above Clean-up can reduce environmental 
damages to some extent , however itself is always far from being 
sufficient to compensate restoration of damaged natural resources  
fully .Although there are many questions concerning the the coverage of  
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resorting the natural resources and the criteria used to assess the  
damage varies from each jurisdiction , the liability for restoring the 
natural resources is tended to be covered by specific statutory law .  
(c) The costs of property damage  
Oil pollution may cause a reduction in the value of public or private 
property, and this part of value reduction is usually measured, for 
produced goods, by cleanup costs or costs of replacement if cleaning of 
the polluted property is not feasible. ( Shavell, 1987) .  
(d) The economic loss 
The economic loss refers to both consequential loss and pure economic 
loss. The former usually means financial loss sustained by a claimant as a 
result of physical loss of or damage to property caused by contamination.  
And the latter comprises the indirect loss arsing from the oil pollution 
such as reduced tourism income due to the polluted coastline. The 
compensation of economic loss is normally dealt by the law tort. 
(e)Punitive damages 
Black’s Law Dictionary presents the following definition on punitive 
damages:  
    “The combined total of monetary losses actually sustained and additional 
monetary losses that can be inferred from facts and circumstances of the case.” 
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In the case of oil pollution, unlike compensatory damages, punitive 
damage awards are controversial and far from being universally 
accepted, it varies from nation to nation. 
In Norwegian legislations, there is no provision for punitive. 69Prof. 
Bjarte Askeland of the University of Bergen, reaches the conclusion that 
generally punitive damages “do not have a tradition” under 
Scandinavian law .Norwegian law does not recognise the concept of 
punitive damages .THE UK permits punitive damages to a limited extent . 
In practice it is quite rare for THE UK court to award it.70 
By contrast, punitive damages in the U.S. are frequently sought and 
huge awards .Though OPA remains silent on the availability of punitive 
damages,  the plaintiffs is allowed to seek it under general maritime 
law, provided the wrongdoer is out of  "gross negligence." .In the case 
of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill , the court of Louisiana has allowed US 
fisherman and businesses suffered from the pollution to seek punitive 
damages from BP, Halliburton, Transocean Ltd., and a host of other 
defendants.71 
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(f) Administrative penalties and / or criminal fines 
Usually acting as deterrence to punish the polluter for his polluting 
behavior payable to the state. In all three jurisdictions, Administrative 
penalties and criminal fines are imposed by specific provisions. 
The specific differences are as below  
1) Under OPA section 1002, there are six categories of recoverable 
damages, namely: removal and government response costs, property 
and natural resource damages, and economic losses resulting from the 
oil spill ,Loss of taxes, royalties, rents, fees or net profit shares. It should 
be note that pure economic loss is recoverable under OPA 90. 
2) In the UK and OPOL regime , removal fee is recoverable , and Pollution 
damage is defined as  “ direct loss or damage by contamination which 
results from a discharge of oil. ”  However how to define “direct ”is 
unclear .In practice , Claims to be considered as admissible would fall 
into the following categories: 1) Clean up operations on shore or at sea. 
2）Property damage  3）Disposal costs of collected material  4）Other 
losses which must be quantifiable and which must result directly from 
the contamination itself.  
Particular consideration is given that Claims must be reasonable, 
quantifiable and justifiable . In addition , personal injury is not covered 
under OPOL  . 
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3) Similar with OPOL ‘s compensation scope, Norwegian Petroleum Act 
covers the removal cost and the loss or damage caused by the pollution .  
Besides , “ incurred by fishermen as a consequence of reduced 
possibilities for fishing ” is also included . 
To sum up , It can be seen that The American liability regime concerning 
the oil pollution arsing from offshore facilities has a boarder scope of 
compensation .Firstly , OPA opens the door for indirect economic losses,  
for example damage claims for entertaining industry around the 
polluted area .Secondly , the US maritime law allows for the possibility of 
punitive damage . 
If one wants to compare the efficiency of all the three regimes, the 
Norwegian regime shall be considered the most efficient as it provides a 
streamlined claim for the victims through clear channeling clause and 
strict liability , at the same time it still allow recourse against those 
ultimately responsible for causing a spill . In addition , Unlike US and THE 
UK , there is no limitation cap in Norwegian regime , which can ensure all 
claims are made in one venue without letting the exceeding limitation 
part to apply tort law . In this way  , the litigation can be simplified in 
most cases .  
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4 Chinese Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Regimes 
4.1 Introduction  
As a growing power, China has an increasingly high demand of oil. By 
2013 Sep, China has surpassed US to be the largest oil importer.72 And 
In term of oil consumption, China is the second. With the need for oil 
surging , China offshore oil industry started to flourish after reform and 
open policy adopted .And the establishment of China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC) On 15 February 1982 ,was a milestone for 
China’s offshore oil industry .Due to the booming economy and high 
dependency on oil , China aims to significantly increase the offshore oil 
production .CNOOC as the largest offshore oil operator ,has set a net 
production target of 338-348 million barrel for 2013, compared with 
341-343 million barrel in 2012, anticipating the start-up of 10 oil and 
natural gas fields offshore China .73 
This chapter analyzes the adequacy and efficiency of China’s liability 
regime relating to oil spill arising from the offshore facilities In the light 
of Bohai oil spill incident .Before going deep to exam specific issues on 
liability regime , it is necessary to have a general view of current China 
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legal environment related to offshore oil operation activities . At the end 
of this chapter, recommendations are given on reform or perfection of 
the legal regime on offshore drilling in China by drawing the successful 
experiences and practice from other countries.  
4.2 2011 Bohai Bay oil spill 
Penglai 19-3 oilfield (PL19-3), the largest offshore oilfield in 
China  ,caused two unrelated oil spill in 4th June 2011 .It is estimated 
that  approximately 723 barrels (115 cubic meters) of oil and 2,620 
barrels (416 cubic meters) of mineral oil-based drilling mud seeping into 
Bohai Bay. And according to ConocoPhillips China, they state: “The 
original seep sources were identified and sealed, and the vast majority 
of mineral oil-based mud that was released to the seabed was recovered. 
Since June 19, 2011, less than three barrels (one half of a cubic meter) of 
oil has been released from the remaining sea bed. ” 74 
The oil field in cooperation with foreign countries by China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 75  and ConocoPhillips China Inc.  
Cooperative exploration and development of oil of the sea in, have the 
rights and interests of 51%, ConocoPhillips76 owns 49%. According to 
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the contract between the parties , ConocoPhillips China is operator of 
this field .Bohai Bay , the largest oil and gas production base offshore 
China ,  is semi-closed inland sea with low self-purifying capabilities. 
The sea is one of the largest fisheries resources in China with distinct 
productivity, strong fishing activity and complicated relationship of food 
web .Many Communities around Bohai Bay including Liao Ning , He Bei , 
Shan Dong and Tian Jin Provinces live on Fisheries and mariculture which 
suffered dramatically in this incident .Bohai Bay area is one of the 
fast-growing industrial regions in China with an area of 2.11 million 
square km and a population of 290 million . With ever expanding 
offshore oil development, the Bohai Sea has become China’s offshore oil 
gulf. 
With Delay of more than one month after oil spill detected, 
ConocoPhillips China did not conceal the accident until July 5th. Then 
China’s State Oceanic Administration (SOA)-the highest marine regulator 
in China ordered ConocoPhillips China to immediately suspend its oil 
production operations of Penglai 19-3 oilfield. The move came 39 days 
after two oil spills . Both the accused concealment of incident by 
ConocoPhillips and the slow response from regulating body revealed the 
fact that China was not ready for a big oil spill like this , oil spill response 
mechanism was deficient . 
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On July 21, 2012 , the Investigation report on this oil spill incident was 
delivered by the Joint Investigation Group led by SOA . The report 
pointes out : “ ConocoPhillips in the operating process of violation of the 
overall development program for oil fields in the system, and exists on 
management of lack, should foresee the risk has not taken the necessary 
precautions, eventually leading to oil spill. Penglai 19-3 oil spill accident 
is causing a major oil spill pollution liability accident.” 77The oil spill is 
known to have affected an area of about 6,200 square kilometers , , and  
840 square nautical kilometers is heavily polluted , which is almost two 
times bigger than Oslo, resulting in severe damage to marine 
environment and local fisheries .78 
The oil spill revealed many loopholes within China’s policies and 
regulations, and there is a highly compelling need to fill these gaps  
As per the Investigation report, the liabilities caused by Penglai 19-3 oil 
spill incident can be sorted out into four categories:79 
1) Liability for cleaning up 
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 Requirements to stop the leak and clean up the polluted area  were 
set by the State Oceanic Administration, COPC was identified to take the 
responsible of cleanup by SOA and CNOOC was requested to assist .By 
the end of August , the cleaning up was completed . It is estimated that 
USD 200 million (RMB 1.3 billion) was spent on response and clean-up 
activities.80 
2) Liability on marine ecological damages  
An agreement reached on June 2012 between SOA as the governing 
body of marine environment and CPOC&CNOOC as the owner of 
Penglai19-3 oil rig .According to the agreement “ COPC and CNOOC 
agreed to pay an aggregate amount of RMB 1.683 billion , RMB1.09 
billion of which paid by COPC is used to compensate the marine 
ecological damage , at the same time CNOOC and COPC paid 480 million 
yuan to establish environment protection fund 81and 113 million yuan, 
respectively, to serve the social responsibility for environmental 
protection of Bohai Bay .” 82 
3) Liability on fishing loss  
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 Another agreement has been reached between governing body on 
fishery resource -Ministry of Agriculture and Government of Liaoning 
and Hebei on one side and CPOC on the other side .Under this 
agreement,“COPC would pay 1 billion to settle claims of losses related to 
marine products cultivation and natural fishery resources in the affected 
areas of the Hebei and Liaoning provinces. COPC and CNOOC will also 
designate a portion from their committed marine environmental and 
ecological protection funds, which are RMB 100 million and RMB 250 
million, respectively, to be used for natural fishery resources restoration 
and preservation, fishery resources environmental monitoring and 
assessment, as well as related scientific research work.” 83 
4) Liability for Administrative Penalty 
On September 1, 2011, The State Oceanic Administrative Department 
ordered an administrative penalty decision of a fine of RMB 200,000 
yuan ($29,850) on ConocoPhillips China subject to Art.85 of the Marine 
Environment protection Law84 , though this oil spill had been regarded 
as the most severe marine pollution.  
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4.3 Regulatory Authorities  
There has been a lack of single regulatory body with sufficient functions 
to formulate, implement a national oil & gas policy and administer the 
country’s offshore oil industry.85  Though some reforms have been 
carried out on restructuring of the government agencies, the current 
oversight in offshore industry is still fragmented among various different 
government agencies. It is a fact there are a complex array of agencies 
and organizations in charge of offshore oil industry and the responsibility 
scope of each is quite unclear.  
 The main authorities are including: 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
NDRC is the general regulatory body for all projects in China, including 
the offshore oil operation project. The main responsibilities of NDRC 
include: determining the key offshore oil operation development plan, 
examining and approving the blocks for Sino-Foreign Cooperation . 
The Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR)  
MLR is primarily charged with regulating oil and gas within China. The 
main regulatory body of Granting exploration/exploitation licenses and 
regulating  the transfer of licenses is MLR . 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
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MOFCOM is responsible for reviewing and approving the contracts with 
foreign participation. 
State Oceanic Administration（SOA） 
SOA is responsible for the management of the national marine affair . 
State Maritime Administration（SMA） 
SMA is the primary body in charge of maritime safety and  pollution 
control. 
 The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) 
MEP is in charge of administering environmental policy and legislation in 
China. 
7) State Administration of Work Safety 
The State Administration of Work Safety is in charge of overall 
supervision and regulation of work safety. 
Though there are various departments to monitor the offshore oil 
operation an activity, the dismal reality is at the national level lines of 
responsibilities between regulating authorities are quite unclear. The 
authority of regulating offshore oil operations is spread through the 
multi-layered government system; therefore little concrete effect can be 
produced. In addition, The division of responsibilities among regulating 
bodies is often unclear and overlapping, Such as MEP and SOA, SOA and 
SMA , the consequence of which is  governing system is  largely 
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fragmented with poor coordination or even competition. When it comes 
to a serious scenario such as oil spill , the allocation of responsibility 
under the unsystematic coordination is usually handled through ad hoc 
discussion between agents , thus excessive bureaucracy prevented 
effective action .  
For example, in the case of Bohai oil spill. When the spill happened State 
Oceanic Administration (SOA) was uncertain about its role in dealing 
with this case, as Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) was 
supposed to play an overall supervision and coordination role. Thus it 
was not until a month later after the spill incurred, did the SOA take firm 
action to monitor this case. In addition due to low technology used in oil 
spill prevention and response ，SOA  failed to locate the oil spill in time 
and caused the delay of clean-up .86 Furthermore, the investigation 
group was led by SOA, a sub-ministerial body, which according to the 
regulations should coordinate other ministries.87 This misalignment of 
levels would certainly affect the effectiveness of the coordination. 
88 There are also concerns regarding the scope and depth of the 
investigation. Since it was led by SOA with participation of seven 
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administrative bodies and ministries , the absent participation of  the 
relevant coastal provinces and departments may cause the insufficiency 
in collecting the first hand data as local fishermen and victims of the oil 
pollution usually seek redness through the coastal departments. 
As per CCICED 2012 report , it summaries the biggest deficiency in 
current China administration structure is “ administrative supervision 
and management system neither clarify the liability of the responsible 
party nor foster an appropriate quality assurance system through 
imposing strong obligations .” In addition , it is bureaucratic politics and 
rising tensions between various ministries that prevented the 
implementation of efficient environmental regulation. 89 
4.4 Overview on Domestic legislation 
It's nearly 3 years since the oil spill accident of Penglai 19-3, but the 
negative effect of this oil spill has been lasting .Though the agreements 
have been made , cleaning up has been completed and part of 
compensation has also been paid by CPOC 90, the discussions in light of 
this incident are still in process - the central point is whether current 
domestic legislations on offshore oil operation is competent enough . 
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One one hand , as the world’s second-largest crude oil consumer  , 
Chinese government has been encouraging the development of  
offshore oil exploration and exploitation industry with increasing 
number of oil rigs built up year by year . On the other hand , the 
challenges  have been presented by incidents to the such as Bohai Bay 
2011 oil spill - current China legal framework  fails to provide effective, 
robust monitoring on complex offshore operations, no comprehensive 
and  reliable liability regime exists . Therefore there is a compelling 
need to reform on regulations .Before turning to making suggestions to 
better stipulate the China’s legislations, the overall legal environment on 
offshore oil operation activities is necessary to exam.  
Generally, the legal system in China has come under criticism “for its lack 
of transparency, ill-defined laws, weak enforcement capacity, and poorly 
trained advocates and judiciary.” 91In addition, the Chinese have shown 
a historic preference for mediation, and thus, more often than not, 
polluters do not have to defend themselves in court. 92 
The governing framework for oil spills in China currently is still a 
combination national and local  laws rules and standards ,Within which  
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various government agencies have the authority to stipulate oil spill 
regulations.  
Exploitation of offshore oil resources 
The petroleum resources within the People’s Republic of China are 
vested in the state .PRC Mineral Resources Law (MRL) is the primary law 
regulating the mineral resources exploitation and exploration activities 
covering both in land and offshore sectors .Under MRL , any party 
seeking to exploit petroleum resources must register with the Ministry 
of land and resources (MOLAR) which is also the authority to grant the 
operation licenses . 93The MRL also regulates general rules on legal 
liability for resource developer, and compliance with labor and 
environmental laws. 
The Regulations of The People’s Republic of China on the Exploitation of 
Offshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises 
(Offshore regulation) is the primary regulatory structure governing 
foreign partnerships with China National Offshore Oil Corporation. 94 
When it involves in foreign investment , the Exploration  blocks have  
to approved by the State Council .The Chinese  partner is responsible to 
apply for the exploration license, which is valid for up to 7 years and may 
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be extended for up to 2 years at a time. In order to get exploration 
license, sufficient Supporting documents are requested which include a 
plan for the exploration plan, qualification evidence of the operating 
partner. Offshore Regulation is supplemented by Provisions of the 
Ministry of Petroleum Industry of the People’s Republic of China for the 
Control of Data concerning the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum 
Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises regarding the data 
control on sino-foreign petroleum exploitation projects. 
Safety regulations for offshore oil operation activities  
China has an extensive set of safety laws and regulations regarding the 
offshore operation activities which include the following: 
1) Law of the People’s Republic of China on Work Safety 
2) Law of the People's Republic of China on Prevention and Control of 
Occupational Diseases 
3) Announcement Of China Offshore Oil Operation Safety Office 
4) Safety Rules For Offshore Fixed Platforms 
5) The Provisions on the Survey of Offshore Oil and Gas Production 
Facilities of the Ministry of 
Energy of the People’s Republic of China 
6) The Provision of Safe Operations on Offshore Petroleum Industry 
7) The Regulation of Safe Operation on Offshore Petroleum Industry 
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8) The Safety Control Provisions on Offshore Petroleum Operations of 
the Ministry of Petroleum 
Industry of the People's Republic of China. 
Environmental protection 
Article 26 of the constitution of the People’s Republic of China from the 
top tier set the importance of environmental protection requires that 
“the state protects and improves the environment in which people live 
and the ecological environment .It prevents and controls pollution and 
other public nuisance.” 95  As noted by one scholar, “China’s 
environmental protection regime is comprised of approximately twenty 
laws, forty regulations, five hundred standards, and six hundred other 
legal norm-creating documents related to environmental protection and 
pollution control.” 96 
 Among these various environmental protection laws, the ones 
regarding the offshore oil operation activities are as below: 
      A) Laws particularly promulgated to protect marine environment. 
As far as offshore pollution incidents are concerned, the key substantive 
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laws consist of the PRC Marine Environment Protection Law (the "MEPL") 
97and the PRC Tort Law. 98 99 
      B) Administrative Regulations adopted by Sate council which 
include: 
Regulations on the administration of Environmental protection in the 
exploration and Development of offshore petroleum, 
Regulations on Prevention and Treatment of the pollution and 
damage to the marine environment by marine engineering construction 
projects. 
Regulations on Control over-dumping of wastes in the ocean.  
C) There are also various rules, Standards stipulated by the ministries or 
departments of the State Council or local government   
 
To sum up, The current legal framework of China in Oil and Gas 
upstream industry fails to provide a comprehensive Petroleum law 
regulating the exploration and exploitation activities. Due to no 
overarching petroleum law , the legal framework is a patchwork with 
weakness in each legislation .The standards and regulations on China 
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offshore oil industry are still ,to an large extent , based on governmental 
supervision, auditing by the third party, and responsible for safety 
operation by the operators.  
4.5 Liability and compensation regime 
Brief overview of liability regime  
The only international convention concerning marine oil pollution that 
China ratified is the 1969 and 1992 Civil Liability with 1992 Fund 
Convention only applicable to the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region. However being a member of CLC 92 convention does not help to 
solve the problem in offshore oil pollution liability regime .Firstly, Oil 
platform is not included in the object scope of CLC 92 which applies to 
vessel source oil pollution . In addition, no unambiguous rule in Chinese 
law on how the international conventions should be applied in China. 
100In practice, confusion arises regarding when should international 
convention be applied, and when the domestic law should be given 
priority. 
Turning to domestic law , the legal framework in China still is not 
competent to provide specialized legislation to regulate offshore drilling 
operation neither specials rules concerning oil pollution liability have 
been made . Therefore, the general tort law and civil law, environment 
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protection statutes are the main sources of offshore oil pollution liability 
regime. 
It should also been noted that in  practice ,  supreme court of the 
People’s Republic of  China published a series of  judicial 
interpretations and documents  , amongst are Summary of the Second 
National Working Conference on Foreign -related commercial and 
maritime trails (2005) and Regulation on the Trails of the compensation 
on Oil Pollution Caused by vessels (implemented from July 2011)which 
are especially important as guidance for  the inferior courts to deal 
with the compensation claims for marine ecological damages . 101The 
rational in these two docs may have reference value to the liability on 
offshore oil pollution. 
Challenges in light of Bohai Oil Spill  
One may clearly see that the Bohai Oil Spill incident highlighted the 
weakness in China’s current offshore oil operation activities legislations, 
revealed the legal framework was an ineffective patchwork with 
weaknesses in each law . 
Definition of responsible party 
One fundamental issue exists in the offshore oil pollution liability regime 
is the unclear definition of “responsible party”. Though it has been 
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promulgated within various Chinese Laws, none of them succeeds to 
solve this problem clearly. 
The General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter referred to as the General Principles of the Civil Law)102   
regulates in general that “Any person who pollutes the environment and 
causes damage to others in violation of state provisions for 
environmental protection and the prevention of pollution shall bear civil 
liability in accordance with the law.”(Article 124). 
Articles 65 and 68 of the Tort Law of the People's Republic of China 
provide that the "Where any harm is caused by environmental pollution, 
the polluter shall assume the tort liability”and " Where any harm is 
caused by environmental pollution for the fault of a third party, the 
victim may require a compensation from either the polluter or the third 
party. After making compensation, the polluter shall be entitled to be 
reimbursed by the third party."  
While Article 41 of the Environmental Protection Law of the People's 
Republic of China provides that "A UNIT that has caused an 
environmental pollution hazard shall have the obligation to eliminate it 
and make compensation to the unit or individual that suffered direct 
losses.” 
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Under both Tort law and Environmental Protection law the responsible 
party for damage is identified by vague express “polluter”, however the 
specific definition of polluter is absent in both statutes . 
Article 90 of the Marine Environment Protection Law of the People's 
Republic of China stipulates “Any party that is directly responsible for 
pollution damage...shall relieve the damage and compensate for the 
losses.” Compared with the definitions in the OPOL, OPA, and PA, the 
simply wording “those who cause pollution damage” is so general and 
vague that fails to guide the identification of responsible party. Though it 
complies with “polluter pays principle”, without an accurate definition of 
“polluter”, it remains doubtful whether it can be effectively 
implemented in practice.103 
Under the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China concerning 
Environmental Protection in Offshore Oil Exploration and Exploitation 
(Referred as Offshore Regulation below ), the responsible party is 
defined as “The enterprise , institution or operator who has violated 
Marine Environment Protection Law and the present 
Regulations ” .however there is no further definition of operator in this 
regulation . The only available definition of operator is found in Marine 
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Environment Protection Law is "an entity engaged in operations of 
offshore oil exploration and exploitation" .  
Therefore, the only unambiguous clue on identifying the responsible 
party is, according to the Offshore Regulation and MEPL, it is the 
operator to assume the liability for violating the MEPL .However, 
Whether MEPL is applicable to civil liability is debated. Some Chinese 
scholars104 hold that the MEPL is an administrative statute in nature, 
while the compensation for oil pollution damage is a civil law issue to 
which only the civil statutes should be applicable and not the 
administrative law. The majority clauses of MEPL are related to the 
supervision and administration of activities that might have an influence 
on the marine environment. 105For instance, Chapter II Is regarding each 
government agency’s function in Supervision and Administration of the 
Marine Environment .In this case , it is justified to apply MEPL to impose 
administrative fine on operator (for the case of Bohai oil spill ,it is COPC)  
However it is debatable to identity operator as responsible party for civil 
liability .106 
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In case MEPL as an administrative law is not applicable for civil liability , 
it falls into the scope of general tort law .However Article 65 of the Tort 
Law of the People's Republic of China use potentially vague term 
“polluter “without giving any further detailed definition. Such 
ambiguous provisions make it difficult to quickly determine the 
responsible party and pursue a claim after an incident of oil spill 
pollution.   
vague scope of compensation  
The scope of compensation is the biggest problem in current liability 
regime concerning the oil pollution arising from the offshore facilities. 
There is no clear specialized provision existed related to the scope of the 
compensation . 
 The only specific provision is article 28 of the Implementation 
Measures of Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning 
Environmental Protection in Offshore Oil Exploration and Exploitation：  
“(1) the removal costs incurred by the sufferers of the seawater, 
biological sources damages of the ocean environmental pollution caused 
by operators' actions；  
(2) the economical losses, repair costs of damaged instruments of pro 
environmental pollution caused by operators' actions；  
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(3) Costs of investigation on the accidents caused by Offshore Oil 
Exploration and Exploitation.” 
Professor Liying Zhang comments “though this provision set an 
uncomprehensive scope of compensation which is potentially useful, 
those guidelines are merely departmental rules that carry little legal 
weight, to the point that they probably will not be considered in 
court.”107  In addition,it is clear that the compensation items listed are 
to a large extent limited to fee concerning the state ‘s response to oil 
spill . It hardly provides legal basis for third party’s damage concerning 
the oil pollution rising from the offshore facilities.  
Marine Environment Protection Law simply stipulates “damages to 
marine ecosystem , marine fishery resources and marine protected 
area ”are recoverable .However these damages are only limited to 
“resulting in heavy losses to state ” , no reference of the third party ‘s 
damage has been made  .Regarding the property damage and 
economic loss suffered by individual , only general tort law can be 
applied , however  provisions in tort  law  are  too general and 
vague  to make the outcome of the compensation foreseeable .  In 
practice, Victims can hardly get adequate remedies by invoking  
provisions in tort law  .  
                                                          
107
 Ibid 
74 
 
who is qualified claimant 
The state as environmental trustee 
Article 90 of the Marine Environment Protection Law stipulates: "for any 
damages caused to marine eco -systems, marine aquatic resources or 
marine protected areas that result in heavy losses to the State, the 
interested department empowered by the provisions of this Law to 
conduct marine environment supervision and control shall, on behalf of 
the State, claim compensation to those held responsible for the 
damages." In other words ,  the competent governing agency can claim 
compensation on behalf of the state regarding the damages caused to 
eco-systems , marine aquatic resources or marine protected 
areas .Article 90 of the MEPL 1999 was appreciated for being an 
important breakthrough in the compensation regime for marine 
ecological damages as it establish the state as environmental trustee to 
get compensation .108 
However, as Article 5 of the MEPL stipulates the power to conduct 
marine environmental supervision and administration is spread over five 
departments, which department should be granted with power to file 
the claim on behalf of the state can be confused. For example, in the 
case of 1983 Eastern Ambassador oil spill case, it was Qingdao 
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Environmental Protection Bureau and Qingdao Bureau of aquatic 
products filed the claim for ecological damages. 109In the similar case of 
1997 Haicheng , unlike the former , it was Zhangjiang Detachment of 
Guangdong Fishery and Maritime Inspection Corps brought the claim .110  
In the latest case -Penglai19-3 oil spill incident, it is SOA to represent the 
state on establishing  a investigation group to work on the 
comprehensive claims  and reach the agreement with  COPC 
concerning the ecological damage .It can be easily seen from above that 
department varies to be on behalf of the state to claim ecological 
damage in each case , therefore In practice , it may cause difficulties for 
the court to identify qualified claimant . 
Units or individuals  
On the other hand, article 41 of the Environmental Protection Law 
stipulates that "a unit that has caused an environmental pollution hazard 
shall have the obligation to eliminate it and make compensation to the 
unit or individual that suffered direct losses.” In addition, under 
Environmental tort in the Tort Law of the People's Republic of China the 
same protection is given to the individual or unit who has suffered direct 
losses. Suit on damages from oil pollution can be filed directly by them. 
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In the case of Bohai oil pill, pursuant to the agreement between COPC 
and MOA, COPC paid 1 billion RMB (about $160 million) to the MOA to 
compensate for damage to fishery. Due to unclear and difficult 
application of the law, inadequacies with the evidence presented by the 
plaintiffs and the imbalance of power between the fish farmers and the 
oil firms, the case was resolved through mediation .It should be noted 
historically there is a tradition in China to not use litigation as a means to 
resolve disputes and mediation is largely encouraged by the government 
at the outset of a dispute rather than litigate in a court of law .111Thus, 
polluters often are not challenged in a court of law.  
However lots of concern was raised on the justification of the mediation 
used in Bohai oil spill case. 
Firstly, Although the oil spills claim adopted the way of reconciliation, a  
the basis of reconciliation should be legal fact investigation and laws.  
However,so far no documents have been demonstrated by both 
ConocoPhillips China / CNOOC and the governing agency  regarding 
what criteria have been used to estimate the loss and damage , and 
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what legal basis they relied on to prove that they should not be liable or 
that their liability could be mitigated.112 
Secondly, the scope of the compensation in the agreement is only 
limited to fishermen, Hebei and Liaoning, does not include Shandong, 
Tianjin damaged fishermen. 113While the settlement agreement does 
not identify Shandong fishermen as oil pollution damaged party, it does 
state: “If any evidence is discovered on damages caused by Penglai 19-3 
Oil Spill Accidents to aquaculture areas in Bohai Bay other than the 
aforesaid areas [Liaoning and Hebei Provinces], administrative mediation 
and other means may still be adopted to resolve the issue.”However the 
argument provided by ConocoPhillips China refuse to compensate 
Shandong fishermen is not convincing enough, ConocoPhiliips stated 
“there is non-correspondence of the oil fingerprint collected from 
polluted breeding foreshores”. 
Thirdly, whether Ministry of Agriculture can represent the party suffered 
damage is under question .As there is no legal basis for a governing body 
to be on behalf of the individual damaged party to claim. From this 
point , Ministry of agriculture does not have the right to reach the 
agreement .   
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The fourth point, If fishermen do not satisfy the amount of 
compensation settled by MOA and COPC , whether the agreement 
signed exempts the COPC from claimed by fishermen directly is also 
debatable .whether it is overlapping suits is also worthy thinking . 
Strict liabilities  
The strict liability is applied in Chinese liability regime concerning the oil 
pollution arising from offshore facilities .Articles 65 stipulates“Where 
any harm is caused by environmental pollution, the polluter shall 
assume the tort liability.” and article 68 stipulates “Where any harm is 
caused by environmental pollution for the fault of a third party, the 
victim may require a compensation from either the polluter or the third 
party. After making compensation, the polluter shall be entitled to be 
reimbursed by the third party.” 
From the above two provisions it can be easily seen that under Tort Law  
a polluter  should bear strict liability for the damage caused by 
environmental pollution . Article 65 broadens the concept of liability in 
environmental tort. Previously, liability for such torts was based 
primarily on a defendant’s violation of applicable environmental laws 
and regulations. Now, under the Tort Law, it seems that a defendant 
could be found liable for an environmental tort even though such 
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defendant complies with applicable environmental laws and regulations. 
114 
Insurance & Compensation Fund  
Offshore regulation Article 9 stipulates “Each enterprise, institution or 
operator shall carry insurance or other financial guaranties in respect of 
civil liabilities for pollution damage”, however no specific requirements  
or  any guidelines have been given on this issue . In practice it is 
normally  to the  discretion of  license granting agency . In addition 
no compensation fund mechanism  has been set up by statute . 
Therefor , there is currently no reliable financial source in China to 
compensate for marine oil pollution damage arising from offshore oil 
facilities.104  The Chinese oil pollution regime would fail to provide a 
secure cover for the victims  due to lack of effective compulsory 
insurance and a compensation fund which prove necessary from an 
economic perspective .115 
low administrative punishment 
According to Rule 15 and rule 85 of the MEPL , fines and/or penalties can 
be imposed on any parties who are found liable for causing pollution to 
the marine environment. However there was a hot debate over the 
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highest administrative penalties according to Chinese existing law. As 
compared to the fine with the same nature imposed by other 
jurisdictions, RMB 200,000 yuan ($32,000) is too low to represent the 
significantly high level of risk involved , many legal experts116 concerned 
such kind of punishment serves to abet rather than deter the 
perpetrators .  
To sum up , it can be easily seen that the legislations for liability 
concerning oil pollution rising offshore facilities are not efficient and 
comprehensive to cover the risk involved. There is a gap between the 
structure, mechanism and law in the legal system of maritime 
environment protection being implemented in China. 117  Big legal 
loopholes exist in the current legal framework of environment 
protection on the following issues :clear identification of responsible 
party , the compensation scope , the qualified plaintiff .In addition , no 
efficient financial security mechanism has been built  .Therefore, there 
is a compelling need for China to perfect the legislations regulating the 
offshore oil spill by drawing on the advanced legislating experience of 
Europe and America . 
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5. Perfecting China’s liability regime on oil pollution rising from 
offshore facilities  
In light of the severe consequence caused by Bohai oil spill , it is time for 
law  makers of China to give  concern over hazards posed by the 
offshore oil and gas industry and begin to review  liability regime for oil 
pollution rising from offshore facilities .Generally, compared with 
countries with a developed legal framework on offshore drilling  , 
China’s legislations still have many deficiencies .By drawing on 
experiences from Norway , THE UK and THE USA ,  recommendations 
are made here to perfect the legislations ,which includes the below : 
1)It is necessary to set clear demarcation of responsibilities amongst 
government bodies .Reducing the multi-layers of government agencies 
and ensuring the coordination between agencies are also of importance 
in promoting the efficiency of government  . 
2)One obvious deficiency in the current Chinese statutes is due to  the 
highly general, often vague and aspirational wording that constitutes a 
familiar feature of Chinese law , Significant elements of many major 
environmental measures seem more akin to policy statements and 
propositions of ideals than to laws. 118A significant factor contributing to 
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this situation is the lack of definitions in Chinese environmental laws. 
Therefore more specific clear definitions should be stipulated. 
3) The offshore oil pollution regime can be governed either primarily 
through a single comprehensive statute and supplemented regulations 
(such as Norway regime) or through separate statutes that solve issues 
of different aspects (such as current China regime).  Since the scope of 
various statutes is potentially overlapping on many issues, a overarching 
principle statute regulating the offshore oil operation activities may 
facilitate a uniformed regime and avoid regulatory duplication. In this 
case Norwegian Petroleum Act is an excellent example .Therefore 
suggestion is given to China law maker that a single statute should 
replace the heterogeneous patchwork with various uncoordinated 
statues related to offshore oil pollution liability in order to provide a 
‘single door ’ which simplifies the application of law . 
4) In OPA, OPOL and Norwegian Petroleum Act , detailed and specific 
provisions on the responsible parties for oil pollution damages  and the 
scope of compensation have been formulated , the relevant responsible 
parties can be identified easily and quickly  which lays a sound 
foundation for subsequent compensation claims and penalty 
administration. Therefore, suggestion is given to stipulate clear provision 
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on identifying the responsible party in the single statute .Also, the scope 
of compensation and claimant need to be clarified. 
 5) It is necessary to strengthen the financial responsibility requirements 
for offshore facilities. An oil pollution fund should also be built to 
facilitate the compensation. 
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